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Abstract 
 
Register files are essential and integral part of any microprocessor 
architecture. Soft errors in the register file can quickly spread to various parts of the 
system and result in silent data corruption. Traditional redundancy based schemes to 
protect the register file are prohibitive because register file is often in the timing 
critical path of the processor. Since it is one of the hottest blocks on the chip, adding 
any extra circuitry to it is not desirable. For embedded systems under severe cost 
constraints, where power, performance, area and reliability cannot be simply 
compromised, we propose a soft error reduction technique for register files. 
This thesis introduces a soft error mitigation scheme, called Self-Immunity to 
increase the resilience of the register file from soft errors, by using unused bits of the 
register file. It is desirable for processors that demand high register file integrity under 
stringent constraints. 
This thesis explains the implementation of our proposed technique to protect 
the register file from soft errors. And show the best overall results compared to state-
of-the-art in register file vulnerability reduction with minimum impact on the area and 
power.  
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Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 Soft error is defined as a wrong signal or data stored in electronic memory. A 
soft error will damage the data being processed but it will not damage any   hardware 
of the system. Soft errors are classified as chip level soft errors and system level soft 
errors. Chip level soft errors occur due to emission of alpha particles into the chip 
when the radioactive atoms in the chip‘s material decay. The emitted alpha particle 
have a positive charge and kinetic energy, it can hit a memory cell and change the 
state to a different value. But it does not damage the actual structure of the chip 
because of a tiny atomic reaction. System-level soft error occurs due to noise. When 
the data is on a data bus and hit with a noise phenomenon, then computer tries to 
interpret the noise as a data bit. The bad data bit also saved in memory and later it will 
cause problems. 
 Occurrence of a soft error in a circuit depends on the energy of the incoming 
particle, the location of the strike, geometry of the impact, and the logic design of the 
circuit. And also it depends on the critical charge. The critical charge , Qcrit is defined 
as the minimum electron charge disturbance required to changing the logic level of 
the circuit. The critical charge is depends on both voltage and capacitance. 
Continuous shrinking in chip feature size and supply voltage, decreases Qcrit. Thus, 
the importance of reduction of soft errors increases as chip technology advances. 
 
Over the last decade, the technology scaling has raised soft errors to become 
one of the major sources for processor crashing, regardless of the increasingly 
complex architectures in the nano scale era. Soft errors caused by charged particles 
are dangerous primarily in high atmospheric conditions, where heavy alpha particles 
are available [1]. However, trends in today‘s nanometer technologies such as 
aggressive shrinking have made low-energy particles, which are more than high-
energy particles, cause sufficient charge to provoke soft errors. Furthermore, there is a 
exact prediction that soft errors will become a cause of an unacceptable error rate 
problem in the near future even in earthbound applications [2]. Researchers have 
7 
 
mainly and traditionally focused on mitigating soft errors in memory and cache 
structures [4], [5], [13], due to their large sizes. 
 
On the other hand, relatively little work had been conducted for register files 
although they are very susceptible against soft errors [8]. Despite the overall rather 
small area footprint of the register file, it is accessed more often than any other 
architectural component [6] [9]. Thus, the corrupted data in any register may 
propagate rapidly throughout the other parts of processor, leading to severe system 
reliability problems [6]. In fact, soft errors in register files can be the cause of a large 
number of system failures [10]. Recently, Blome et al. [8] showed that a considerable 
amount of faults that affect a processor usually come from the register file. Though, 
some processors protect their registers with Error Correction Code (ECC) [11], but 
such solutions may be prohibitive in certain applications (like embedded) due to the 
significant impact in terms of area and power [14]. Moreover, power consumption 
was conventionally a major concern in embedded systems due to their considerable 
effects on the system. 
 
1.2 Register file soft errors 
 
Register file (RF) is highly vulnerable to soft errors, and existing redundancy 
based soft error protection schemes to protect the RF are prohibitive because RF is 
often in the timing critical path of the processor. Since it is one of the important 
blocks on the chip, and adding any extra circuit to it is not desirable. Technology 
scaling trends increase the susceptibility of microprocessors to soft errors. The 
demand for embedded microprocessors in a wide array of safety critical applications, 
compounds the importance of the soft error problem. 
 
To overcome these problems, there is a severe need of techniques to increase 
the register file integrity against soft errors with a small effect on both area and power 
overhead. This thesis addresses this challenge by introducing a technique, called Self-
Immunity to protect the register file from soft errors, especially necessary for 
processors that require high register file integrity under stringent constraints. 
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This thesis will contribute the following things: 
(1) A soft error mitigation technique for improving the immunity of register files 
against soft errors by storing the ECC in the unused bits of a register. 
(2) Protecting register file by achieving high area and power saving with a slight 
degrading in the register file vulnerability reduction (7%) compared to a full 
protection scheme. 
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Background 
 
2.1 Soft error background and terminology 
 
2.1.1 MTBF and FIT 
 
Vendors express an error budget at a reference altitude in terms of Mean Time 
between Failures (MTBF). Errors are often further classified as undetected errors or 
detected errors. The former referred to as silent data corruption (SDC); we call the 
latter detected unrecoverable errors (DUE). Note that detected recoverable errors are 
not errors. Note that the processor MTBF must be significantly higher than the system 
MTBF, particularly for large multiprocessor systems. 
 
Another commonly used unit for error rates is FIT (Failure in Time), which is 
inversely related to MTBF. One FIT specifies one failure in a billion hours. Thus, 
1000 years MTBF equals 114 FIT (109 / (24×365×1000)). A zero error rate 
corresponds to zero FIT and infinite MTBF.  
 
To evaluate whether a chip meets its soft error budget— possibly via the use 
of error protection and mitigation techniques—microprocessor designers use 
sophisticated computer models to compute the FIT rate for every device—RAM cells, 
latches, and logic gates—on the chip. The effective FIT rate for a structure is the 
product of its raw circuit FIT rate and the structure‘s vulnerability factor, defined as 
the probability that a circuit fault will result in an observable error. The total FIT rate 
of the chip is calculated by adding the effective FIT rates of all the structures on the 
chip. 
 
Current predictions show that typical raw FIT rate numbers for latches and 
SRAM cells vary between 0.001 – 0.01 FIT/bit at sea level. The total FIT contribution 
of logic gates today is a negligible fraction of the FIT contribution from latches, so we 
concern ourselves only with faults due to strikes on latches and SRAM cells. In the 
future, if the contribution of logic becomes non-negligible, we could incorporate the 
effective FIT rate due to a logic block into the FIT rate of the latch that it feeds. 
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2.1.2 Vulnerability Factors 
 
The effective FIT rate per bit is influenced by several vulnerability factors. A 
vulnerability factor shows the probability that an internal fault in a device‘s operation 
will result in an externally visible error. For example, when a level-sensitive latch is 
accepting data rather than holding data, a strike on its stored bit may not result in an 
error, because the erroneous stored value will be overridden by the (correct) input 
value. If the latch is accepting data 50% of the time, this effect results in a Timing 
vulnerability factor for the latch of 50%. For simplicity, we assume this timing 
vulnerability factor is already incorporated in the raw device fault rate. The 
computation of the device fault rate also includes some circuit-level vulnerability 
factors. 
 
The architectural vulnerability factor (AVF) expresses the probability that a 
visible system error will occur given a bit flip in a storage cell. The AVF can have a 
significant impact on the effective error rate of a processor. Prior studies with 
statistical fault injection into RTL models have demonstrated AVFs of 1%-10% for 
latches and 0% - 100% across a range of architectural and micro architectural state 
bits. 
The earliest schemes of register file protection such as Triple Modular 
Redundancy (TMR) and ECC can achieve a high level of fault tolerance but they may 
not be suitable solutions in embedded systems due to their power and area overheads. 
Recently, Fazeli et al. [14] shown that protecting the entire register file with SEC-
DED comes with about 20% power overhead. The proposed approach in [15] utilizes 
the Cross-parity check as a method for correcting multiple errors in the register files. 
Spica et al. [16] achieved a little gain (just 2%) in fault tolerance for caches if they 
increase the protection to Double Error Correction while the overhead for that gain is 
considerable. 
 
Building on the concept of Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF), 
introduced by Mukherjee [3], Yan et al. [19] proposed the Register Vulnerability 
Factor (RVF) to describe the probability of a soft error in registers can be spread to 
other system components. In general, a value is written into a register, then it is read 
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frequently from the register, and later a new value is written into the register again. 
Thus, any soft error occurring during ―write-write‖ or ―read-write‖ intervals will have 
no effect on the system, because by the next write operation it will be automatically 
corrected. Whereas, the intervals ―read-read‖ and ―write-read‖ are considered as 
vulnerable intervals as shown in Figure-2.1. The RVF of a register is defined as the 
sum of the lengths of all its vulnerable intervals divided by the sum of the lengths of 
all its lifetimes [19]. 
                                         
Vulnerability (reg) = (∑Vulnerable Interval Time) ∕ (∑Life time) 
 
 
Finally, the total vulnerability of the register file is taken as the sum of vulnerability 
of all registers [21]. 
 
                          Vulnerable Intervals                      Invulnerable Intervals 
 
                    Write-Read        Read-Read   Read-Write   Write-Write 
 
  
                  W        R         R       R        R        R         W     W     W          R        Time 
 
Figure-2.1: Different Register Access Intervals [19] 
 
The pure software approach at compile level introduced by Yan et al. [19] re-
schedules the instructions in order to decrease the RVF of a register file but the 
proposed technique is not always very effective because it may increase the execution 
cycles and even the RVF in some benchmarks [19]. In a bid to decrease the area and 
power penalties, Yan et al. [19] proposed a scheme to protect a subset of the registers 
instead of full protection schemes and modify the register allocation algorithm to 
assign the most sensitive registers against soft errors to the protected registers. The 
achieved RVF reduction is 23%, 41%, 67% and 93% for protecting 2, 4, 8 and 16 out 
of 32 registers respectively. Montesinos [9] make a decision of which register values 
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should be protected at runtime by hardware logic but the runtime prediction is very 
costly in terms of energy [22]. Lee et al. [7] presented a compile technique to reduce 
RVF by protecting a small part of memory and write the vulnerable register values in 
this memory by inserting load/store instructions but it increases both runtime and code 
size. 
 
Another important approach is In-Register Replication ―IRR‖ [17], which 
exploits the fact that a large fraction of register values are less than or equal to 16 bits 
wide for 32- bit architectures. Such values can be replicated in the same register for 
increasing the immunity against soft errors. The fundamental conflict is that, while 
increasing the immunity of the register file against soft errors by reducing the 
vulnerability of the register file, this reduction (either with full or partial protection 
schemes) increases the area and power overheads. 
 
2.2   Register Vulnerability factor 
 
While it is critical to protect the register file against soft errors, not all soft 
errors occurred in the register file can lead to visible system faults. Over-estimation of 
the soft error problem can result in over-design of the protection mechanisms, which 
will increase the reliability cost eventually. On the other hand, insufficient protection 
of register files will make the system unreliable and thus is useless. As a result, 
designers must accurately measure the probability that register soft errors can impact 
other system components and thus lead to erroneous final output. Recently, 
Mukherjee proposed the concept of architectural vulnerability factor (AVF), which is 
defined as the probability that a fault in a processor structure will lead to a visible 
error in the final output of program. In general, the AVF provides designers an 
accurate estimate of the soft error rate for various hardware components for making 
cost/reliability trade-offs. While the concept of AVF can also be applied to the 
register file, but it fails to exploit the fact that soft errors in the register file can be 
automatically overlapped by the new values written to the register file. If a value with 
soft errors is written before it is read, it will have no impact on the system output.  
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Toward the goal to measure register file susceptibility to soft errors accurately 
and quantitatively, we define the register vulnerability factor (RVF) to be the 
probability that a soft error in registers can be propagated to other system components 
(i.e., functional units, memory). In contrast to the concept of AVF, which focuses on 
the effect of soft error propagation, the RVF concentrates on the probability of soft 
error propagation to other hardware elements. It should be noted that even if a soft 
error occurred in the register file is consumed by an instruction; it may still not affect 
the final output since this instruction may be miss-speculated. Obviously, the RVF 
and the AVF can be combined to select the most cost-effective techniques to increase 
the register file reliability against soft errors. Since processors only employ a limited 
number of architecture registers while programs typically use a large number of 
values, multiple values can be stored in the same register as long as their lifetimes do 
not overlap. In general, a value is first written into a register, then it is read by one or 
more times and finally another value is written into the same register, which finishes 
the lifetime of the old value and begins the lifetime of the new value. 
 
As depicted in figure-2.1, we can divide the accesses to register files into four 
different patterns (or intervals), namely, the write-read (W-R), read-read (R-R), read-
write (R-W) and write-write (W-W) patterns (note that the read/write mentioned in 
the thesis refers to the corresponding operations on register values, including but not 
limited to the load/store instructions, which operate on the data from the memory 
hierarchy). Among these four patterns, the register file is only susceptible to soft 
errors during the W-R and R-R intervals. In contrast, the soft errors occurred during 
the R-W and W-W intervals can be overlapped by the latter write operations, and 
hence will not impact other system components. It is widely accepted that fault-
inducing particle strikes are randomly and uniformly distributed, therefore, the 
probability that a soft error in registers can be propagated to other system components 
can be computed as the average ratio that the register values are exposed to the 
susceptible intervals (i.e., W-R and R-R), as described in Equation below. In this 
Equation, RVi represents any register value, the Susceptible Time (RVi) represents 
the time intervals that RVi is exposed to the susceptible intervals (i.e., W-R and R-R 
intervals for RVi), and the Lifetime (RVi) represents the lifetime of RVi, which is 
time interval between the time that a register is allocated for RVi and the time it is 
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overlapped by another value. Since both the Susceptible Time (RVi) and Lifetime 
(RVi) can be easily obtained from a performance simulator, by using these values we 
can compute the RVF. 
 
             RVF= (∑Susceptible Time (RVi)) / (∑Lifetime (RVi)) 
 
The RVF indicates the probability that register soft errors can spread to other 
hardware elements and thus impact the system output. The higher the RVF, the lower 
the register file reliability, and hence more expensive techniques are needed to fight 
soft errors. Measuring the RVF is not only useful to understand the reliability 
requirement of register files accurately for avoiding both the over-protection or under-
protection, it also opens up avenues for software (e.g., compiler) to enhance register 
file reliability by reordering the read/write operations to reduce the RVF. In contrast, 
traditional software optimizations mainly focus on performance. Therefore, the RVF 
allows compilers to consider both performance and reliability to optimize the register 
access patterns. Such a software based approach has no hardware overhead, which is 
fundamentally different from traditional space redundancy or information redundancy 
techniques. 
 
Methods to reduce register vulnerability factor are: 
(a) Rescheduling of Instructions to Reduce RVF. 
(b) Reliability oriented Register Assignment with Partial ECC Protection. 
 
A simple way to reduce RVF is to find heavily executed loops, identify unused 
registers in them, and save or restore the registers before or after the loops. Anyhow, 
with such an ad-hoc method, it is not only hard to achieve optimal results but also 
very cumbersome to handle complex control flows, recursive functions, and even 
function calls. Furthermore, an intra-procedural optimization has a fundamental 
weakness that it can protect even unnecessary intervals, which significantly lowers the 
efficiency of ad-hoc methods. We approach this as an optimization problem: given a 
performance bound, what is the set of program points in which to insert save/restore 
operations so that the transformed program will achieve the minimum RVF with 
minimal code size overhead? This is inherently an inter-procedural problem, since 
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register save/restore operations can easily affect other functions along the program 
paths, not only in terms of functionality but also more in terms of RVF, and also 
because identifying long vulnerable intervals will necessarily demand considering 
more than one functions. Other challenges include devising simple yet effective 
save/restore operations, inserting them not overly but just enough to guarantee the 
code size, the program correctness, and accurately estimating their effect on 
performance, and RVF, in the midst of complex control flows and function calls. 
 
2.3  Summary 
 
With the shrinking feature size, lower supply voltage, higher density and 
frequency, soft errors are becoming an increasing challenge for microprocessor 
design. To protect processors against soft errors, the first step is to understand the   
vulnerability of different hardware components to soft errors. Based on the accurate 
estimate of the reliability requirement, the most cost-effective technique can be 
selected to meet the pre-defined reliability goal, which is of particular importance for 
embedded systems with cost constraints. 
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Self-Immunity Technique 
 
3.1 Proposed Self-Immunity Technique 
 
 
We propose to exploit the register values that do not require all of the bits of a 
register to represent a particular value. Then, the upper unused bits of a register can be 
used to increase the register‘s immunity by storing the corresponding SEC Hamming 
Code [11] without the requirement for extra bits. The Hamming Code is indicated by 
k, the number of bits in the original word and p, the required number of parity bits 
(approximately log2k). Thus, the code word will be (k + log2k + 1) [23]. In our 
proposed technique, the optimal value of k is the value that guarantees that w, the bit 
width of the register file, can cover both k, the required number of bits to represent the 
value, and the ECC bits of the value. The value and its ECC bits should be stored 
together within the bit-width of a register. Consequently, the condition (k + log2k + 1 
≤ w) should be valid. Thus, in 32-bit architectures the optimal value of k is 26 and in 
64-bit architectures k is 57. 
For instance, when studying 32-bit architectures, where each register  
represent a 32-bit value, we may exploit the register values, which require less than or 
equal to 26 bits by storing the  ECC bits in the upper unused six bits of that register to 
enhance the register file immunity against soft errors. We call this technique Self- 
Immunity and we call such values ―26-bit‖ values. On the other hand, we call the 
register values which need more than 26 bits to be represented ―over-26-bit‖ register 
values. Figure-3.1 shows the percentage of register values usage for different 
applications of the MiBench Benchmark [12] compiled for MIPS architecture. 
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Figure-3.1: “26-bit” register values and “over-26-bit” register values in different 
benchmarks [24] 
 
As it can be noticed, in all benchmarks most of the register values are ―26-bit‖ 
values. In other words, the upper six bits of 88% of the stored data in the register file 
are actually unused. Consequently, we can store the corresponding ECC in these 
available bits and increase the register‘s immunity. In addition to the previous key 
observation, the contribution of ―26-bit‖ register values in the total vulnerable 
intervals is much more than the contribution of ―over-26-bit‖ register values. In 
Figure3.2, the fraction of vulnerable intervals of each benchmark is reported. As is 
demonstrated, the fraction of vulnerable intervals of ―26- bit‖ values is 93% on 
average. 
 
 
 
Figure-3.2: The fraction of vulnerable intervals of “26-bit” register values and 
“over-26-bit” register values in different benchmarks [24]. 
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3.2 Problem Description 
 
 The goal of our technique is to reduce vulnerability of the register file with 
minimum impact on both area and power. Let N is the total number of registers and V 
is the vulnerability of a register, then the vulnerability of the register file is (ΣNi=1 Vi). 
As the power overhead comes from accessing the encoder and decoder, it can be 
approximately modeled through the number of accesses [22]. Let M is the number of 
protected register values and A is the number of accesses, then the total power 
overhead can be estimated as (ΣMi=1 Ai). Thus, our goal can be formulated as:  
 
 Minimize (V= ΣNi=1 Vi), Minimize (P = Σ
M
i=1 Ai) 
 
 
3.3 Architecture for Our Technique 
 
The difficulty in distinguishing whether the ECC bits are embedded in the 
register value or not, is that the processor does not have sufficient information to 
make this decision while reading a value from a register. Hence, we need to classify 
―26-bit‖ register values from ―over-26-bit‖ register values. To do this, a self-π bit is 
associated with each register and we initially clear all self-π bits to indicate the 
absence of any Self-Immunity. For the sake of simplicity, we explain the proposed 
architecture with the required algorithms in two different steps. 
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3.3.1 Writing into a register- Figure3.3 illustrates that whenever an instruction 
writes a value into a register it checks the upper six bits of that value if they are '0' or 
not. If they are (26-bit register value case), the corresponding self-π bit is set to '1' 
indicating the existence of Self-Immunity. The ECC value will be generated and stored 
in the upper unused bits of the register. Hence, the data bits and its ECC bits are 
stored together in that register. In the second case (over-26-bit register value), the 
corresponding self-π bit is set to '0' and the value is written into the register without 
encoding. 
                                                     I/p Data [31…0] 
         
                                                                                                0: non self immunity case 
 No 0                                                        Yes  1       1: self immunity case   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
  
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
                                                                               Self immunity case                                
 
                                                                             31                     0                   
                                                               
                                                                                         Non-self immunity case                                                                                                           
                          Non         n     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-3.3: Micro-architectural support for writing a register value. 
 
Check the upper six bits 
if they are zeros? 
 Encoder          
                MUX 
      Register Self-π 
0    ECC    data 
     
          Data 
1 
0 
Example-writing the value ‘154’ into a register. 
I/p data=0000000000000000000000010011010 
Self-π=’1’ 
Coded data=00011000000000000000000010011010 
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3.3.2 Reading from a register: For read operations, to distinguish between a Self-
Immunity case and a non self-Immunity case the self-π bit is used. In the self immunity 
case, the data value and the corresponding ECC bits are stored together in that register 
and consequently the value should be decoded. In the non self immunity case, the 
stored value is not encoded as a result there is no need to decode the value as shown 
in Figure-3.4. 
                
 
                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-3.4: Micro architectural support for reading a register value. 
 
 
 
3.4 Implementation details 
 
 
Since the probability of multiple bit-errors is largely lower than the single bit-
error [20], a single bit-error model has been considered. In this fault injection 
environment, faults will be injected on the fly while the processor executes an 
application. In the each fault injection simulation, one of the 32 registers is chosen 
randomly and a bit in that register is selected randomly and then flipped. Observe that 
a write operation clears out the previous injected error into that register by storing a 
new value. Likewise, by using a uniform distribution, a random cycle is selected as 
the time that soft error occurs. This guarantees that the faults will be provoked only 
when the program is executed [20]. Since an injected fault might create an infinite 
loop, a watchdog timer was implemented for the required number of execution cycles. 
When the cycle count exceeds two times the number of cycles in the fault-free case, 
we stop the simulation. 
          Register Self-π 
Decoder 
     MUX 
If (self-π=‘1‘) 
Data [25…...0] = decoder (register [30…0])                          
Data [31….26] =‖000000‖ 
Else                
Data [31….0] =register (31….0) 
End if  
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Towards evaluating our proposed technique, to take into account different 
possible scenarios for register utilization, we use different applications from MiBench 
Benchmark compiled for MIPS architecture [12]. Simulations were conducted by 
using the MIPS model simulator [18]. When a simulation terminates, the 
corresponding output information that consists of final results, the register file 
content, the time for execution and state of the processor are stored and used to 
classify the simulation. We exploit the following categories proposed in [10] [20] ,     
to classify the simulation, 
 
1. Wrong Answer: The application terminates normally but the results produced 
are not correct. 
2. Latent: The application terminates normally and the results are correct but at 
the end of simulation the content of the register file is different from that of 
fault-free case. 
 
3. Effect-Less: The application terminates normally and the results are correct, 
and the content of the register file is similar to that of fault-free case. 
 
4. Exception: The processor detected the injected fault and generated an 
exception (e.g., invalid address exception). 
 
5. Timed-Out: The application failed to terminate and produce results with a 
predefined time limit. 
 
6. Stalling: The processor computed the expected results in a time greater than 
the time of fault-free case. 
 
7. Crashing: The processor fails to terminate normally. 
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 For a good comparison, we consider three models of the processor: 
 
Base: a normal processor (without implementing any protection technique). 
IRR: a fault tolerant model, where an In-Register Replication technique [17] is 
implemented. This technique has been chosen here because it tries to achieve a similar 
goal as our proposed technique. 
SI: a fault tolerant model, where our proposed Self-Immunity technique is 
implemented. 
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Simulation Results 
 
As expected, our technique maintains very high levels of fault tolerance 
compared to the ―Base‖ case. The self-immunity technique improves the register file 
integrity effectively by reducing largely the number of errors in each category. Also 
the number of errors reaches zero in some benchmarks. Since latent errors have no 
effect on the output of an application, they are less harmful. This means that we can 
safely add the ―Latent‖ category to the ―Effect-Less‖ category [20] since in both 
categories the final results are still completely correct. In this case the system fault 
coverage after implementing our technique reaches on average 93% and up to 100%. 
 
Writing into a register:  (self immunity case) 
 
When writing a 26 bit value into a register then self immunity bit (load)  set to ‗1‘ and  
the ECC value (encoded value) is generated by using encoder and stored in the upper 
six unused bits of the register. Hence, the data bits and its ECC bits are stored together 
in that register. 
 
 
Figure-4.1: Test wave forms for Encoding block 
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Reading from a register: 
 
The self immunity bit (load) is used to distinguish between a Self-Immunity case and a 
non self-Immunity case. If load =‘1‘ then the data value and the corresponding ECC 
are decoded by using decoder. 
 
 
 
Figure-4.2: Test wave forms for Decoding block 
(The above wave forms represent the intermediate values generated during 
simulation by encoder and decoder.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure-4.3: Test wave forms for Top-level block 
(The above Wave form represents the actual input value and the output value.) 
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Effectiveness of our technique 
 
 In a full protection scheme, an ECC generation is performed with each write 
operation and similarly ECC checking is performed with each read operation. Our 
self immunity technique decides to protect the value depending if it is valid for Self-
Immunity, then only it activates the ECC generator to compute the ECC. Otherwise, 
the ECC generation is skipped. Similarly, instead of always checking ECC, for every 
register read operation, our technique checks whether the ECC is being embedded in 
the register value or not and ECC checking is performed if embedded. On average 
12% of the data will be stored in the register file without protection. As a result, our 
technique reduces M and it may lead to reduce the consumed power. As is when 
studying 32-bit architectures, 93% (on average) of the total vulnerable intervals are 
vulnerable intervals of valid register values for our technique. In other words, around 
93% of vulnerable intervals will potentially be invulnerable. Thus, our technique 
guarantees to reduce the vulnerability of the register file considerably. 
 
Potential Power Saving 
 
In our proposed architecture, ―over-26-bit‖ register values are neither encoded 
nor decoded and consequently the encoding and decoding operations are not 
performed with each read and write operation as it happens in a full protection 
scheme. This may reduce the power consumption of our proposed architecture 
because the encoding and decoding operations are performed only in the case of ―26-
bit‖ register values. Figure-3.5 demonstrates that on average 12% and 13% of the total 
number of read and writes operations, respectively, are occurred in the case of ―over-
26-bit‖ register values. As a result, our proposed technique may consume less power 
because the encoder and decoder are lesser times accessed. 
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Figure-4.4: The percentage of read and write operations in the case of “over-26-
bit” register values [24] 
 
Since the input of the deployed encoder in our architecture is 26 bits instead of 
32 bits, it generates 5 parity bits instead of generating 6 parity bits. The used decoder 
in our architecture takes 31 bits (26 bits for data + 5 bits for ECC) as input instead of 
taking 38 bits as input. In other words, our proposed technique uses a less complex 
encoder and decoder. This may also lead to a further saving in the terms of the power 
consumption. Finally, our proposed technique decreases the total number of bits of a 
protected register from 38 bits to 33 bits and as a result the consumed switching 
power is lower. In other words, the power saving is mainly due to the usage of a less 
complex ECC generator and checker, fewer ECC operations, and the absence of 
additional storage for ECC. 
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FPGA Implementation 
 
To investigate the advantages of using our technique in terms of area overhead 
against ―Fully ECC‖ and against the partially protection techniques, we implemented 
and synthesized for a Xilinx XC3S500E different versions of a 32-bit, 32-entry, dual 
read ports, single write port register file. Once the functional verification is over, the 
RTL model is taken to the synthesis process using the Xilinx ISE tool. In synthesis 
process, the RTL model will be converted to the gate level net list mapped to a 
specific technology library. Many different devices were available in the Xilinx ISE 
tool in this Spartan 3E family,. In order to synthesis this design the device named as 
―XC3S500E‖ has been chosen and the package as ―FG320‖ with the device speed 
such as ―-4‖. 
RTL Schematic 
 The RTL (Register Transfer Logic) can be viewed as black box after 
synthesize of design is made. It shows the inputs and outputs of the system. By 
double-clicking on the diagram we can see gates, flip-flops and MUX. 
 
Figure 5.1: Schematic with Basic Inputs and Output 
Here in the above schematic, that is, in the top level schematic shows all the inputs 
and final output of design. 
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Figure 5.2: Blocks inside the Top Level Design 
 
The internal blocks available inside the design includes encoder, decoder 
which was clearly shown in the above schematic level diagram. Inside each block the 
gate level circuit will be generated with respect to the modeled HDL code. 
 
Figure 5.3: Blocks inside the Developed Encoder, Decoder Design 
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Figure 5.4: ECC Block inside the encoder Design 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Encoder block inside the ECC Design 
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Figure 5.6: The decoder block 
 
Synthesis Result 
 This device utilization includes the following. 
 Logic Utilization 
 Logic Distribution 
 Total Gate count for the Design 
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The device utilization summery is shown above in which its gives the details 
of number of devices used from the available devices and also represented in %. 
Hence as the result of the synthesis process, the device utilization in the used device 
and package is shown above. 
 
=============================================================
*                            Final Report                               * 
============================================================= 
Final Results 
RTL Top Level Output File Name: Top_Level.ngr 
Top Level Output File Name  : Top-level 
Output Format                  : NGC 
Optimization Goal                 : Speed 
Keep Hierarchy                    : NO 
Design Statistics 
# IOs                              : 66 
Cell Usage: 
# BELS                             : 2 
# GND                         : 1 
# INV                          : 1 
# Flip-flops/Latches          : 104 
#      FDE                         : 26 
#      FDR                         : 78 
# Clock Buffers                : 1 
#      BUFGP                    : 1 
# IO Buffers                     : 59 
#      IBUF                        : 27 
#      OBUF                      : 32 
============================================================= 
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Device utilization summary: 
--------------------------- 
Selected Device: 3s500efg320-4  
 
 Number of Slices:            60 out of   4656     1%   
 Number of Slice Flip Flops:     104 out of   9312     1%   
 Number of 4 input LUTs:        1 out of   9312     0%   
 Number of IOs:                       66 
 Number of bonded IOBs:         60 out of    232    25%   
 Number of GCLKs:                 1 out of     24     4%   
--------------------------- 
Partition Resource Summary: 
--------------------------- 
No Partitions were found in this design. 
 
============================================================= 
 
 
TIMING REPORT 
NOTE: THESE TIMING NUMBERS ARE ONLY A SYNTHESIS ESTIMATE. 
FOR ACCURATE TIMING INFORMATION PLEASE REFER TO THE TRACE 
REPORT GENERATED AFTER PLACE-and-ROUTE. 
Clock Information: 
 
-----------------------------------+------------------------+-------+ 
Clock Signal                       | Clock buffer (FF name)  | Load  | 
-----------------------------------+------------------------+-------+ 
Clock                              | BUFGP                  | 104   | 
-----------------------------------+------------------------+-------+ 
Asynchronous Control Signals Information: 
---------------------------------------- 
No asynchronous control signals found in this design 
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Timing Summary: 
--------------- 
Speed Grade: -4 
Minimum period: 1.319ns (Maximum Frequency: 758.150MHz) 
Minimum input arrival time before clock: 5.014ns 
Maximum output required time after clock: 4.283ns 
Maximum combinational path delay: No path found 
Timing Detail: 
-------------- 
All values displayed in nanoseconds (ns) 
 
The below figure shows the place and route of the design and the area 
occupation as well in the FPGA. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: the area occupation of the Design  
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Conclusion 
 
For embedded systems under severe cost constraints, where power, 
performance, area and reliability cannot be simply compromised, we implemented a 
soft error mitigation technique for register files to improve the immunity to soft 
errors. Our experimental results on different embedded system applications 
demonstrate that our proposed Self-Immunity technique decreases the register file 
vulnerability effectively and achieves high system fault tolerance. Furthermore, our 
technique is generic so that it can be implemented into diverse architectures with 
minimum impact on the cost. 
It can be concluded that this technique achieves the best overall result 
compared to state-of-the-art in register file vulnerability reduction. 
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